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Abstract 
This study complements existing literature by investigating how military expenditure can 
modulate the effect of terrorism externalities on tourism. The geographical and temporal 
scopes are 163 countries and the period 2010-2015. The empirical evidence is based on 
negative binomial regressions. Terrorism externalities are measured in terms of terror-related 
incidents, injuries, fatalities and damaged properties. We find that military expenditure 
significantly lessens the destructive impact of these terror-related incidents in order to induce 
positive net effects on tourism. This finding is robust to all measurements of terrorism. 
Homicides and violent demonstrations reduce tourists’ arrivals whereas the rate of 
incarceration of convicted offenders has the opposite effect. The analysis is extended to 
income levels and regions in order to provide more opportunities for policy implications.  
Justifications for differences in these comparative tendencies are discussed.  
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Introduction 
Two main tendencies in the extant literature motivate the positioning of this study 
notably: a debate on the relevance of military expenditure in mitigating the number and 
destructive effects of terrorist attacks and gaps in the literature. The propensities are further 
substantiated in the same order as they are highlighted.  
 First, a recent stream of literature has been motivated by a debate on the 
ineffectiveness of military measures as policies towards counterterrorism (Feridun & 
Shahbaz, 2010; Asongu, Tchamyou, Asongu, & Tchamyou, 2017a).  According to the main 
narrative, a consensus exists in the literature on the position that military expenditure does not 
reduce the incidence of terrorism. While intuitively, one can expect military spending to 
negatively impact on the number and damaging effects of terrorism; this intuition is not 
supported by empirical evidence. On the contrary, such counterterrorism measures have been 
shown to provoke more terrorist attacks (Sandler, 2005). This position is consistent with the 
assertion by Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley (2006) that decades of concerted efforts by the 
United States Government at countering terror-related attacks have further fuelled the 
phenomenon both in the country itself and its ally nations.  Then too, Feridun and Shahbaz 
(2010) concluded that causality is from terrorism to “spending in defense” and not the 
opposite. Further, Omand (2005) posited that such counteracting actions against terrorism are 
not effective because of the absence of commonly acceptable long-run and comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategies around the world.  
 The positioning of our study contributes to the foregoing debate by departing from a 
direct assessment of the potential relevance of military spending on terrorism. We argue that 
the broad consensus in the literature on the ineffectiveness of military measures on terrorism 
could be due a lack of consideration of the possible indirect interactions between them.  The 
modelling approach in this study is based on a series of interactive regressions so  that the 
military expenditure measures are combined with indicators of terrorism externalities to affect 
a development outcome.  
  Second, the gaps in the literature can be discussed in two major strands. The first 
involves studies on the relationship between military interventions, foreign occupation and 
terrorism. The second examines the connection between military involvements and tourism. 
With respect to the first aspect of the literature, Collard-Wexler, Pischedda, and Smith 
(2014) investigated whether foreign occupation increases the rate of suicide terrorist attacks. 
They concluded that the former significantly increases the prevalence of the latter. Also, Choi 
and Piazza (2017) examined if military interventions affected terrorist suicide attacks. It was 
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reported that exceptionally, the intervention from foreign nations (e.g. interventions that are 
pro-government and entail a high number of ground troops) positively affect suicide attacks in 
countries in which there is military intervention. Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah (2018) 
assessed whether military expenditure could be instrumental in modulating the effect of 
terrorism on capital fight. They established that contingent on set terrorist targets, a threshold 
of military spending between 4.224 and 7.363 percent of GDP is necessary in order to 
completely dampen the negative consequences of terrorism on capital flight.  
In terms of the second part of the literature which focused exclusively on the 
relationship between military interventions and tourism, Fletcher and Morakabati (2008) 
found that military interferences exert negative effects on tourism in Kenya and Fiji. 
Additionally, Mansfeld and Pizam (2006), noted that tourists’ arrivals and civil wars are 
highly correlated in the sense that the latter discourages the former. Tourism may even be 
non-existent in the event of protracted and severe civil wars, such as the recent case of Syria 
(Mehmood, Ahmad, & Khan, 2016). After the Turkish invasion in 1974, tourism in Cyprus 
was substantially adversely affected  (Sharpley, 2003; Farmaki, Altinay, Botterill, & Hilke, 
2015). In summary, the damaging impact of wars on the tourist industry of a nation is not 
exclusively restricted to the number of tourist arrivals. It also extends to the overseas image of 
the destination country over a long term. For instance, the conflict between South Korea and 
North Korea has exerted a considerable damaging influence on the tourist sector in South 
Korea (Rittichainuwat & Rattanaphinanchai, 2015).       
We extend the two strands of literature by using military expenditure as a proxy for 
pro-active security, which is contrary to the established evidence on the role of military 
interventions on tourism. Accordingly, despite the negative consequences that military 
interferences such as coups may have on the tourist industry, the importance of military 
spending has been recognised as an armoury in the fight against terrorism in order to boost 
human development outcomes (Asongu et al., 2017a ; Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018). 
In theory, terrorists’ agents may be discouraged to carry out attacks in the knowledge of the 
military spending capacity of the targeted countries. The positioning on this study on the 
indirect determinants of tourism by means of the interaction between policy syndromes1 and 
                                                          
1
 With respect to Fosu (2013), policy syndromes reflect circumstances that were not conducive for economic 
growth in the post-independence era in Africa. These include: ‘administered redistribution’, ‘state breakdown’, 
‘state controls’, and ‘suboptimal inter temporal resource allocation’. Asongu (2018a) considers policy syndromes 
as issues that merit policy action in order to achieve sustainable development. For Asongu (2017), a policy 
syndrome is a gap in knowledge economy while Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017a) consider it as growth that is 
exclusive (i.e. non-inclusive). Within the context of this study, policy syndromes are externalities of terrorism, 
notably: terror-related incidents; injuries, fatalities; and damaged properties.  
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policy variables departs from mainstream literature which has largely focused on direct 
determinants and deterrents of tourist arrivals (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos, & Tarlow, 1999; 
Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Kingsbury & Brunn, 2004; Sönmez &  Graefe, 1998; Correia, Silva, 
& Moço, 2008; Yuksel & Yuksel, 2008; Chhabra, 2009; Saha &  Yap, 2013; Alvarez &  
Campo, 2014; Mehmood et al., 2016).  
In the light of the above argument, by assessing the relevance of military expenditure 
in moderating the effect of terrorism on tourism, this study contributes to the debate on the 
significance of military expenses in directly fighting terrorism along the lines discussed in the 
first strand. In addition, it extends the tourism literature by examining the relevance of 
military expenditure in moderating terrorism in order to promote the development of the 
tourist industry. Therefore, the key objective of the present study is to investigate how a 
policy variable (represented by military expenditure) can be used to curb the potential 
negative influences of policy syndromes (approximated by terror-related incidents, injuries, 
fatalities and damaged properties) on tourist arrivals. The research question which the study 
aims to answer is stated as follows: how does military expenditure modulate the damaging 
effect of terrorism externalities on tourism across the world?  
It is important to note that peace and terrorism factors have been documented to affect 
tourism (Asongu, Nnanna, Biekpe & Acha-Anyi, 2019a) and while security officers and the 
police have also been established to mitigate homicide (Asongu, Nwachukwu & Pyke, 2019b) 
and drive tourism (Asongu, Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2019c), the role of military expenditure in 
modulating terrorism externalities in order to promote tourism has not been adequately 
explored. The theoretical underpinning which is related to the Wound Culture Theory (WCT) 
is discussed in the next section.  
 
Theoretical underpinnings and literature review  
Theoretical underpinnings  
The Wound Culture Theory (WCT) is the theoretical underpinning motivating the study. This 
is essentially because; intuitively military capability can be used to assuage the wound culture 
that reinforces the motivation for resorting to violence and other terrorism channels. As 
emphasized by Gibson (2006), the WCT which was first proposed by Mark Seltzer (1998) can 
be summarized in the following (p. 19):                                                                                                                                                                 
“Serial killing has its place in a public culture in which addictive violence has become not 
merely a collective spectacle but one of the crucial sites where private desire and public 
fantasy cross. The convening of the public around scenes of violence–the rushing to the scene 
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of the accident, the milling around the point of impact–has come to make up a wound culture; 
the public fascination with torn and open bodies and torn and open persons, a collective 
gathering around shock, trauma, and the wound”.  
 With respect to the WCT, the objective of shattering the human body is often harbored 
by individuals in society. Such an intention to rip the human body is both literal (i.e. via 
mutilation) and figuration (via criticism). The importance of serial killings is considered as a 
common denominator that motivates citizens to engage in wound appreciation: “One 
discovers again and again the excitations in the opening of private and bodily and psychic 
interiors; the exhibition and witnessing, the endlessly reproducible display, of wounded 
bodies and wounded minds in public. In wound culture, the very notion of sociality is bound 
to the excitations of the torn and open body, the torn and exposed individual, as public 
spectacle” (Seltzer, p. 137). It is further observed by Seltzer that the wound theory has 
considerable ramifications in the formation of citizens’ attitude: “The spectacular public 
representation of violated bodies, across a range of official, academic, and media accounts, 
in fiction and in film, has come to function as a way of imagining and situating our notions of 
public, social, and collective identity (p.21).”    
The policy syndromes (i.e. terrorism incidents, injuries, fatalities and damaged 
properties) used in the study, are associated with a wound culture which, can intuitively be 
mitigated by military expenditure in order to promote the image of the country overseas with 
a concomitant increase in tourism.  Beyond emphasis on theoretical underpinnings, the study 
could also be a theory-building exercise because applied econometrics is not exclusively 
limited to the acceptance and rejection of existing theories. Hence, we are consistent with 
recent literature in arguing that applied econometrics based on sound intuition is a useful 
scientific activity (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan, Mishra, & Narayan, 2011; Asongu, 
Tchamyou, Minkoua, Asongu, & Tchamyou, 2018). Moreover, we do not argue that the 
government makes decisions regarding military spending, exclusively on the basis of tourist 
arrivals. Governments make such decisions on the basis of economic development outcomes, 
of which the tourist industry is among. 
 
Literature review: perceived risk and tourism 
 It is important to discuss the connection between perceived risk and tourism. 
Terrorism externalities translate into perceived risk that discourages tourist arrivals. In the 
same vein, it is the role of forces of law and order (which are used as policy variables in this 
study) to mitigate such perceived risk in order avoid the discouragement of tourist arrivals. In 
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essence, a broad stream of tourism literature supports the position that safety is a fundamental 
need for people in every society and that tourists avoid destinations in which they have high 
perceived risks for their safety (Sönmez et al., 1999; Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Kingsbury & 
Brunn, 2004). This narrative is consistent with another stream of literature emphasising the 
position that the choice of a tourism destination is contingent on safety considerations 
(terrorism, civil unrest, regional conflict, political instability or crime), which affect a 
destination’s desirability, security, comfort and image (e.g., Ryan, 1993; Tarlow, 2006;  
Pizam &  Mansfeld, 2006; Seabra, Dolnicar, Abrantes, & Kastenholz, 2013). The perilous 
effect of the underlying security features has substantial impacts on tourists’ perception of risk 
regarding the tourism destination (see Lepp, Gibson, & Lane, 2011). The is very fundamental 
owing to the fact that the perception of risk in one country can influence the perception of risk 
in neighbouring countries which may not be directly engaged in a conflict or directly 
connected with the concern about insecurity (Lepp  & Gibson, 2003). This narrative is 
consistent with the consequences of the Gulf war on tourist destinations in Kenya and 
Tanzania (Honey, 1999) and the impact of the Syrian war on the Turkish (Yaya, 2009) and 
Jordanian (Liu, Schroeder, Pennington-Gray, & Farajat, 2016) tourism industries. It follows 
that regional conflict, wars, civil unrest, political instability and terrorism are becoming global 
concerns for tourists communities and the tourism industry as a whole (Mansfeld & Pizam, 
2006). 
 Terrorism represents a principal source of issues negatively affecting tourist 
destinations.  There is a bulk of literature which maintains that terrorism induces anxiety and 
fear in future tourists and hence affects their levels of perceived risks (see Drakos & Kutan, 
2003; Kapuściński & Richards, 2016).  Within this framework, terrorism is conceived and 
defined as the calculated measures that leverage on the threat of diabolic force and/or violence 
to instil fear within society in order to meet goals that may be political, social and/or religious. 
According to Hoffman (2006), terrorism is a plot with the purpose of materialising substantial 
psychological impacts on and beyond attack targets. Hence, with the occurrence of a violent 
act in a destination country, with the purpose of generating chaos in society (by means of 
hijacking, terror, murder and sabotage), the perception of risk increases while the desire to 
visit the corresponding country as a tourist destination decreases (Shin, 2005). For instance, as 
documented by Pizam (1999), the higher the frequency for violent and criminal activities, the 
greater their effect on the demand for tourism. Moreover, Llorca‐ Vivero (2008) has analyzed 
the tendency of tourist arrivals in G-7 countries, against terrorism activities in the 134 
destination countries to conclude that both international and domestic terrorism have a 
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significant effect on tourist arrivals. Goldman and Neubauer-Shani (2017) establish a 
significant nexus between tourist arrivals and terror incidents in a country. Moreover, 
incidences of terrorism in a Middle Eastern and/or Islam-dominated country have spillover 
effects across the region (Taylor, 2006; Neumayer & Plumper, 2016). In summary, there is a 
broad stream of literature supporting the evidence that terrorist attacks limit the demand for 
tourism destinations in which the underlying attacks occur, notably: in Spain (Enders & 
Sandler, 1991); China (Gartner & Shen, 1992); United States (Lepp & Gibson, 2003), 
Pakistan (Raza & Jawaid, 2013); Israel, Greece and Turkey (Drakos & Kutan, 2003) and 
Nepal (Bhattarai, Conway, & Shrestha, 2005).  It is important to note that the narrative on this 
strand is consistent with the Wound Culture Theory underpinning this study which has been 
discussed, prior.   
 Apart from the literature suggesting the negative effect of terrorism on tourists’ 
arrivals, there is also a small strand of the literature maintaining that such an effect may either 
be insignificant or positive. For instance, Saha and Yap (2013) have established that terrorists’ 
attacks have a positive incidence on tourist arrivals in countries characterized with low to 
moderate political-risk.  In the same vein, when analyzing tourist’s resilience and 
vulnerability to terrorism, Liu and Pratt (2017) show that the incidence on tourism from 
terrorism varies with destinations and the effect is contingent on initial income, tourism and 
political stability levels in the sampled 95 countries. Some findings have established that the 
continuous emphasis on tourists’ hot spots in a risky destination reduces the perception of risk 
from tourists in the long term (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006). Such emphasis could be on the 
effectiveness of forces of law and order in maintaining peace and stability.  This inference 
which is partly motivating the positioning of our study is consistent with Shin (2005) who has 
emphasized that a precondition for the success of a tourism destination is peace and security, 
which is maintained by forces of law and order, used in our study as a policy variable.   
 In spite of the sparse literature on a positive connection between tourism and 
terrorism, the literature is substantially dominated by the deterrent role of terrorism on 
tourism. Moreover, while a terrorist incident can have a short term paralyzing effect on 
tourists’ arrivals in destination countries (Liu & Pratt, 2017; Coshall, 2003), continuous 
conflicts and political conflicts generate more substantial and far-reaching impacts (Sönmez 
& Graefe, 1998; Saha & Yap, 2013). In essence, political turmoil can substantially limit 
travels to areas affected by the underlying political terror as well as create a lasting wall to 
international tourism (Sönmez, 1998). For instance, countries such as Israel and Palestine that 
are constantly confronted with State crisis are associated with a reducing number of tourist 
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arrivals (Alvarez & Campo, 2014; Mehmood et al., 2016). In the same vein, the tourism 
industry of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been negatively affected by the recent phase of 
political instability (Causevic & Lynch, 2013).  
 Military coups also have a negative effect in the development of the tourism industry. 
Fletcher and Morakabati (2008) have established that such is the case in Keny and Fiji. 
According to  Mansfeld and Pizam (2006), there is a correlation between civil wars and 
tourist arrivals. An eloquent recent case is Syria: a country where terrorism is almost non-
existent because of the ongoing civil war (Mehmood et al., 2016). Tourism in Cyprus was 
substantially curtailed by the Turkish invasion in 1974 (Sharpley, 2003; Farmaki et al., 2015). 
Significant nexuses are apparent in linkages between tourism, terrorism and economic growth 
in Thailand (Fareed, Meo, Zulfiqar, Shahzad & Wang, 2018) and connections between 
terrorism and tourism in Greece (Samitas, Asteriou, Polyzos &  Kenourgios, 2018). 
Furthermore, the effect of wars on a country’s tourism industry is not limited to the number of 
tourist arrivals but well extend to the destination’s image in the long term. For example, in 
South Korea, tourism has been extensively influenced by the nature of conflict between the 
North and the South (Rittichainuwat & Rattanaphinanchai, 2015).                
 In the light of the above, despite the apparent strong linkage between terrorism, peace 
and tourism, the extant literature has not engaged the role of forces of law and order in 
mitigating the negative effect of terrorism on tourists’ arrivals. The missing gap is addressed 
in the sections that follow.  
 
Data and methodology 
This study uses a panel of 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. The data comes from a 
multitude of sources, notably: the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the United Nations 
(UN) Committee on Contributions, the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS), the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-
Related Deaths Dataset and Qualitative assessments by Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
analysts’ estimates. The geographical and temporal scopes of the study are contingent on 
constraints in data availability: a justification that is in accordance with recent literature 
(Asongu, 2018b; Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2019). 
 The economic development outcome indicator is the number of tourist arrivals; the 
policy variable is military expenditure while the policy syndromes or terrorism externalities 
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are captured by four main variables, namely: terror-related incidents, injuries, fatalities, 
damaged properties. The choice of the outcome variable, policy variable and policy 
syndromes is motivated by the literature on the determinants of tourism, terrorism, violence 
and crimes discussed earlier (see Blanco & Grier, 2009; Freytag, Kruger, Meierrieks, & 
Schneider, 2011; GPI, 2016;  Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016, 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2017b).  
 Four main control variables are adopted in this study, namely: homicides, 
incarceration of convicted offenders, likelihood of violent demonstrations and the number of 
armed service personnel. The selection of these variables in the conditioning information set 
is consistent with existing studies on the determinants of tourism (Sönmez &  Graefe, 1998; 
Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Sönmez et al., 1999; Alvarez &  Campo, 2014;   Kingsbury & 
Brunn, 2004; Mehmood et al., 2016; Saha &  Yap, 2013). We expect homicides and violent 
demonstrations to negatively influence tourist arrivals while the incarceration of convicted 
offenders and armed service personnel should have the opposite effect.  
 The definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1 whereas 
Appendix 2 discloses the summary statistics (Panel A) and sampled countries (Panel B). The 
corresponding correlation matrix is provided in Appendix 3. From the descriptive statistics, it 
is apparent that the standard deviation of the outcome variable is considerably higher than its 
corresponding mean. This is an indication that a negative binomial regression is an 
appropriate model of estimation.  Moreover, the outcome variable is positively skewed, which 
further justifies the need for an estimation technique that is not contingent on a normal 
distribution. In accordance with recent literature on the analysis of positively-skewed data 
(Choi & Luo, 2013; Choi, 2015), a negative binomial regression is adopted in this study. It 
follows that the main justification for adopting negative binomial regressions as empirical 
strategy is because tourist arrivals or the outcome variable is count data.  
In the corresponding regressions, the mean of y is determined by the exposure time t  
and a set of k  regressor variables (the x’s). The expression relating these quantities is 
disclosed in Equation (1) below:  ��
 
= �xp (ln(��) + �1�1� + �2�2� + ⋯ + �k�k�),                                                                   (1) 
 
where, �1 ≡ 1 and β1 is the intercept. β1, β2, …, βk correspond to unknown parameters to be 
estimated. Their approximations are symbolized as b1, b2, …, bk. The fundamental negative 
binomial regression model for an observation i  is disclosed in Equation (2) below:  
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in the generalised Poisson distribution which  includes a gamma 
noise variable with a mean of 1 and a scale of  . The parameter μ represents the mean 
incidence rate of y per unit of exposure or time. Hence, μ is the risk of a new occurrence of 
the event during a specified exposure period, t (NCSS, 2017). Consistent with recent literature 
(see Mlachila, Tapsoba, & Tapsoba, 2017; Asongu, Anyanwu, & Tchamyou, 2017b), the 
independent variables are lagged by one year in order to control for endogeneity.   
 
Empirical results 
Presentation of results 
The empirical results are disclosed in this section. Table 1 is presented in two main panels. 
Whereas Panel A focuses on estimations without a conditioning information set (or control 
variables), Panel B presents estimations that involve a conditioning information set. In order 
to examine the role of military expenditure in modulating the effect of terrorism externalities 
on tourism, net effects are computed, consistent with extant studies based on interactive 
regressions (Tchamyou, 2019a; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017).   
 Given the above insights, in the last column of Table 1, the net effect from role of 
military spending in controlling the consequences of “terrorism-related property damages” on 
tourism is 0.360  ([-0.291× 1.966] + [0.933]), where: 0.933 is the unconditional impact from 
“terrorism-related property damages”; 1.966 is the mean value of military expenditure and -
0.291 is the conditional effect from the interaction between the military expenses  and 
“terrorism-related property damages”.   
Three major findings are established in Table 1.  
First, net effects are not apparent in regressions without control variables because at 
least one of the estimations (unconditional, conditional or both) needed for the computation of 
net effects is not statistically significant. Conversely, net effects are obvious in all regressions 
with control variables. This is logical because in the real world, terrorism, military 
expenditure and tourism do not interact in isolation. Hence, other factors that are exogenous 
to tourism (provided by the conditioning information set) are worthwhile in order to avoid 
issues of variable omission bias.  
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Second, military expenditure tempers terrorism in order to induce positive net effects 
on tourism. This finding is robust to all terrorism externalities considered, namely: terror-
related incidents, injuries, fatalities, and damaged properties.  
Third, the statistically significant control variables display the expected signs. 
Accordingly, as predicted, homicides and violent demonstrations reduce tourists’ arrivals 
whereas the rate of incarcerations of convicted offenders has the opposite effect. Although the 
effect of “armed service personnel” is not significant, it has the expected positive sign.    
The overwhelming positive net effects is consistent with the theoretical expectations 
of this study, notably, that terrorism-oriented policy syndromes which are linked to wound 
culture can be modulated by military spending in order to increase economic development 
outcomes (which includes tourism). Accordingly, the image of the country for tourism 
purposes can be increased with the knowledge that the potential terrorism externalities can be 
tackled with military measures that are associated with enhanced military expenditure.  
The specifications in which net effects cannot be computed are largely traceable to 
specifications that do not involve the conditioning information set. The absence of net effects 
can be understood in the following: the interaction between military expenditure and terrorism 
externalities is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the promotion of tourism. 
Accordingly, in order for the anticipated positive net effect to occur, other macroeconomic 
factors should be involved in the conditioning information set. This is logical because in a real 
world, the underlying interactions are not apparent in isolation.  
 
**INSERT Table 1ABOUT HERE** 
 
Extension with income levels and regions 
In order to create opportunities for policy implications, the empirical model in equation 1 
above is extended to include income levels and regions. Consistent with the recent 
development in the literature, the inclusion of these fundamental characteristics also helps to 
account for some of the unobserved heterogeneity that is exogenous to the tourist industry 
(Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013, 2014; Beegle, Christiaensen, Dabalen, &  Gaddis, 2016;  
Mlachila et al., 2017; Asongu & le Roux, 2017). The corresponding income levels include: 
high income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low income nations while 
selected regions are South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Middle 
East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.  
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**INSERT Table 2 ABOUT HERE** 
 
**INSERT Table 3 ABOUT HERE** 
 
The following findings are observable in Table 2 with regard to decomposition by 
income levels. In Panel A, compared to low income countries, high income countries are more 
susceptible to the interaction of military expenditure with terrorism externalities, leading to an 
overall positive net effect on tourism. This tendency is confirmed in Panel B, where such 
estimated positive military spending-terrorism externalities net effects in the group of upper 
middle income countries are comparatively higher than the positive net effects reported for 
the sample of lower middle income countries. 
 In Table 3, Panel A, we present the results for the group of South Asia and Europe and 
Central Asia countries while in Panel B we disclose the findings for East Asia and the Pacific 
and Latin America and the Caribbean. Panel C shows results for the Middle East and North 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The estimated positive net effects from the implied 
interactions between military spending-terrorism externalities are visible in South Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean as well as  the Middle East and North Africa. By contrast, the 
same combinations between military spending and terrorism externalities do not yield 
significant net effects in our sample of Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific and 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries.  
 In what follows, we discuss the economic development relevance of the tendencies 
observed in the comparative findings. Higher income countries are more likely to effectively 
use military disbursements in a manner that mitigates the potential damaging consequences of 
terrorism externalities on the tourist sector. Alipour and Kilic (2005), Fosu (2013), Anyanwu 
and Erhijakpor (2014) and Efobi (2015) noted that these rich nations have the general 
infrastructure including logistics, finance and institutions that considerably improve the 
effectiveness of military spending and its deployment in the planning and execution of tourist 
trade. Moreover, our results are supported by the perception in recent terrorism literature that, 
compared to low income countries, the quality of infrastructural arrangements in high income 
countries helps to assuage the negative externalities of terrorism on economic development 
outcome (Gaibulloev & Sandler,  2009; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017). The exception of 
14 
 
“Europe and Central Asia” may be traceable to the weight of Central Asian countries in the 
terrorism measurements.  The regional findings are broadly consistent with the comparative 
tourism literature: “It was found that geographical regions were constructed in three broad 
ways: some places, such as Europe and North America, were perceived as safe; Africa, was 
seen as dangerous and to be avoided; and finally, Asia was constructed as simultaneously 
risky but also exotic and worth experiencing” (Carter, 1998, p.349). 
 
Concluding implications and Future Research Directions 
 
This study has complemented existing literature by investigating how military expenditure 
can modulate the effect of terrorism externalities on tourism. Terrorism externalities are 
measured in terms of terror-related incidents, injuries, fatalities and damaged properties.  The 
geographical and temporal scopes are 163 countries and the period 2010-2015. The empirical 
evidence is based on negative binomial regressions with and without income levels and 
regions.  
The results of the basic and extended negative binomial regression analysis indicate 
that: Military spending significantly lessens the potential adverse consequences of terrorism 
with concomitant positive net effects on tourist arrivals. This finding is robust to all terrorism 
externalities. Homicides and violent demonstrations reduce tourists’ arrivals whereas the rate 
of incarcerations of convicted offenders has the reverse effect. Compared to low income 
countries, military spending in high income countries are associated with a higher positive net 
effect on tourism. Such a tendency is confirmed when upper middle income countries are 
compared with lower middle income countries. Moreover, the estimated positive net effects of 
the implied interactions between military expenditure-terrorism externalities are apparent only 
in our sample of South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East and North 
Africa countries. Potential justifications for the lack of comparable significant positive net 
effects in Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific as well as  Sub-Saharan Africa 
were discussed.  Such included the paucity of infrastructural arrangements including logistics, 
finance and institutions that considerably diminish the effectiveness of military spending and 
its deployment in the planning and execution of tourist trade. 
 In the light of the positioning of this study (articulated in the introduction), the 
established findings have complemented existing literature in two key ways: First, contrary to 
the mainstream literature on the inefficiency of military expenditure in directly controlling the 
adverse economic consequences of terrorism (Sandler, 2005; Omand, 2005;  Lum et al., 2006 
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; Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010), we have confirmed that military disbursements can indirectly 
moderate terrorism externalities in order to influence positive economic development 
outcomes. Second, whereas military intercessions such as coups have been established in the 
literature to discourage tourist arrivals  (Sharpley, 2003; Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008; 
Mansfeld & Pizam, 2006; Farmaki et al., 2015; Rittichainuwat & Rattanaphinanchai, 2015; 
Mehmood et al., 2016), we have shown in this study that military expenditure (which is not 
synonymous to military intrusion) can theoretically play both pro-active (i.e. preventive  and 
figurative) and active (i.e. literal and real) roles in the discouraging terrorism.  In what 
follows, some attendant policy implications are discussed.  
 First, the fact that net effects are not largely apparent in specifications without a 
conditioning set implies that increased military spending should be engaged within a 
framework of complementary macroeconomic factors. Accordingly, the interactions between 
policy syndromes and policy variables to influence an outcome such tourism are not in 
isolation but require other complementary measures (i.e. that are determinants of tourism) to 
be involved in the conditioning information set.  
 Second, building on evidence from the literature, military actions associated with 
military spending should be tailored with the insight that less repressive policies are 
fundamental because excessive repression can be eventually counter-productive. Hence, 
should be linked with other policy initiatives that mitigate potential avenues of terrorism, inter 
alia, such complementary measures can be tailored to delivery more public commodities, 
reduce income inequalities and enhance education programs designed to sensitize the 
population of sampled countries on the perilous economic ramifications of terrorism.  
 Third, drivers of terrorism can also be acknowledged as a concern of public health, 
such that preventive actions and public information on the negative effect of the scourge can 
be encourage through novel social media and information networks, especially as it pertains 
to social wellbeing campaigns and societal education. Preventive programs can also be 
oriented towards terrorism hotspots that are likely to also be associated with high levels of 
crime and economic inequalities.  
 
 Fourth, beyond military intervention, less aggressive modes of terrorism prevention 
and mitigation should also be considered. Within this framework, diplomatic mechanisms to 
addressing terrorism-oriented concerns should also be taken on board. Hence, while a military 
action can be considered an option of fighting terrorism, it should always be used as a 
measure of last resort after all diplomatic and less aggressive measures have been considered. 
16 
 
When these non-military measures are explored, new information technology tools should be 
used to keep the international community constantly aware of the options being taken to 
reduce potential terrorism externalities. Such information can prevent the discouragement of 
tourists’ arrivals because tourists are more likely to choose a tourist destination that is not 
characterized by war, owing to military intervention compared to one that is characterized by 
war on terror.  
Future research can focus on investigating whether the established findings withstand 
empirical scrutiny within country-specific dimensions. Such idiosyncratic cases are relevant 
for more targeted or country-specific policy implications.   
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Table 1: Negative Binomial Regressions  
         
 Dependent variable: Number of Tourist Arrivals  
  
 Without control variables With control variables 
   
Constant  15.150*** 15.448*** 15.470*** 15.359*** 15.980*** 16.356*** 16.392*** 16.182*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure(ME) (-1) 0.098 0.127 0.051 0.051 0.020 -0.083 -0.097 -0.018 
 (0.457) (0.296) (0.682) (0.654) (0.821) (0.353) (0.305) (0.818) 
Terrorism incidents(-1) 0.548*** --- --- --- 0.721*** --- --- --- 
 (0.001)    (0.000)    
Terrorism fatalities(-1) --- 0.259 --- --- --- 0.426*** --- --- 
  (0.112)    (0.000)   
Terrorism injuries(-1) --- --- 0.245 --- --- --- 0.359*** --- 
   (0.052)    (0.000)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages(-1) 
--- --- --- 0.593*** --- --- --- 0.933*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Terrorism incidents×ME(-1) -0.122 --- --- --- -0.209*** --- --- --- 
 (0.102)    (0.000)    
Terrorism fatalities×ME(-1) --- -0.096 --- --- --- -0.139*** --- --- 
  (0.239)    (0.007)   
Terrorism injuries×ME(-1) --- --- -0.050 --- --- --- -0.091** --- 
   (0.404)    (0.027)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages×ME(-1) 
--- --- --- -0.132 --- --- --- -0.291*** 
    (0.177)    (0.000) 
Homicides(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.509*** -0.591*** -0.559*** -0.532*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incarceration(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.684*** 0.736*** 0.706*** 0.701*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Violent demonstrations(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.453*** -0.380*** -0.414*** -0.431*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Armed Services Personnel(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.111 0.108 0.100 0.076 
     (0.370) (0.402) (0.434) (0.540) 
         
Net effects na na na na 0.310 0.152 0.180 0.360 
         
Log likelihood  -9568.759 -9594.048 -9586.963 -9576.344 -9434.054 -9464.079 -9457.072 -9441.240 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square  56.18*** 5.60 19.77*** 41.01*** 325.59*** 265.54*** 279.55*** 311.22*** 
Alpha 1.851*** 1.965*** 1.932*** 1.884*** 1.3290*** 1.433*** 1.408*** 1.353*** 
Observations  580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Mean value of Military Expenditure: 1.966. Min and Maximum values of  
Military Expenditure are respectively 1.000 and 5.000. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of  unconditional effects of insecurity 
variables and/or conditional effect from the interaction between the security policy variable and insecurity variables.  
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Table 2: Decomposition by Income Levels   
         
 Dependent variable: Number of Tourist Arrivals 
 Panel A: Low and High Income countries  
 Low Income  High Income  
Constant  12.281*** 12.294*** 12.222*** 12.242*** 16.61*** 17.01*** 16.914*** 16.650*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure(ME) (-1) -0.040 -0.006 0.020 -0.013 0.273* 0.223 0.268 0.321** 
 (0.825) (0.969) (0.896) (0.920) (0.070) (0.190) (0.101) (0.023) 
Terrorism incidents(-1) -0.004 --- --- --- 0.674*** --- --- --- 
 (0.987)    (0.001)    
Terrorism fatalities(-1) --- -0.019 --- --- --- 0.255 --- --- 
  (0.945)    (0.562)   
Terrorism injuries(-1) --- --- 0.109 --- --- --- 0.786*** --- 
   (0.550)    (0.000)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages(-1) 
--- --- --- 0.174 --- --- --- 0.931*** 
    (0.625)    (0.001) 
Terrorism incidents×ME(-1) 0.015 --- --- --- -0.119 --- --- --- 
 (0.921)    (0.161)    
Terrorism fatalities×ME(-1) --- -0.002 --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- 
  (0.985)    (0.953)   
Terrorism injuries×ME(-1) --- --- -0.051 --- --- --- -0.155* --- 
   (0.582)    (0.083)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages×ME(-1) 
--- --- --- -0.065 --- --- --- -0.223* 
    (0.716)    (0.061) 
         
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  na na na na na na 0.481 0.492 
         
Log likelihood  -1727.864 -1727.851 -1727.748 -1727.72 -2855.545 -2873.145 -2864.588 -2862.349 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  32.65*** 32.68*** 32.88*** 32.94*** 90.83*** 55.63*** 72.75*** 77.23*** 
Alpha 0.937*** 0.936*** 0.935*** 0.935*** 0.742*** 0.880*** 0.810*** 0.793*** 
Observations  119 119 119 119 166 166 166 166 
         
         
 Panel B: Lower Middle Income and Upper Middle Income levels 
 Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income 
Constant  16.760*** 16.429*** 16.271*** 16.941*** 16.983*** 18.038*** 18.030*** 16.864*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure(ME) (-1) -0.255 -0.269* -0.182 -0.286* -0.209 -0.636** -0.566* -0.136 
 (0.143) (0.099) (0.303) (0.069) (0.507) (0.038) (0.077) (0.628) 
Terrorism incidents(-1) 0.457*** --- --- --- 1.316** --- --- --- 
 (0.001)    (0.000)    
Terrorism fatalities(-1) --- 0.494*** --- --- --- 0.925*** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.001)   
Terrorism injuries(-1) --- --- 0.481*** --- --- --- 0.834** --- 
   (0.000)    (0.033)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages(-1) 
--- --- --- 0.578*** --- --- --- 2.010*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Terrorism incidents×ME(-1) -0.149** --- --- --- -0.401*** --- --- --- 
 (0.024)    (0.007)    
Terrorism fatalities×ME(-1) --- -0.155** --- --- --- -0.219* --- --- 
  (0.012)    (0.083)   
Terrorism injuries×ME(-1) --- --- -0.152** --- --- --- -0.220* --- 
   (0.010)    (0.096)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages×ME(-1) 
--- --- --- -0.199*** --- --- --- -0.670*** 
 
   (0.007)    (0.001) 
         
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects 0.164 0.189 0.182 0.186 0.527 0.494 0.401 0.692 
         
Log likelihood  -2492.320 -2490.352 -2488.717 -2492.07 -2203.342 -2209.129 -2213.087 -2202.434 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  155.89*** 159.83*** 163.10*** 156.39*** 73.71*** 62.13*** 54.22*** 75.52*** 
Alpha 1.054*** 1.035*** 1.018*** 1.052*** 0.836*** 0.895*** 0.938*** 0.827*** 
Observations  160 160 160 160 135 135 135 135 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Mean value of Military Expenditure: 1.966. Min and Maximum values of  
Military Expenditure are respectively 1.000 and 5.000. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of  unconditional effects of insecurity 
variables and/or conditional effect from the interaction between the security policy variable and insecurity variables.  
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Table 3: Decomposition by regions  
         
 Dependent variable: Number of Tourist Arrivals 
 Panel A: South Asia and “Europe and Central Asia”  
 South Asia  Europe and Central Asia  
Constant  9.266*** 11.983*** 9.735*** 8.982*** 18.646*** 18.408*** 18.523*** 18.945*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure(ME) (-1) 1.494** 1.094 1.811** 1.825** -0.242*** 0.111 0.018 -0.184 
 (0.022) (0.149) (0.019) (0.012) (0.492) (0.760) (0.959) (0.559) 
Terrorism incidents(-1) 1.399*** --- --- --- 0.485 --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.173)    
Terrorism fatalities(-1) --- 1.542*** --- --- --- 0.439 --- --- 
  (0.005)    (0.507)   
Terrorism injuries(-1) --- --- 1.501*** --- --- --- 0.486 --- 
   (0.000)    (0.245)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages(-1) 
--- --- --- 1.878*** --- --- --- 0.565 
    (0.000)    (0.281) 
Terrorism incidents×ME(-1) -0.371** --- --- --- 0.081 --- --- --- 
 (0.045)    (0.468)    
Terrorism fatalities×ME(-1) --- -0.498* --- --- --- 0.046 --- --- 
  (0.052)    (0.885)   
Terrorism injuries×ME(-1) --- --- -0.452** --- --- --- 0.016 --- 
   (0.024)    (0.936)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages×ME(-1) 
--- --- --- -0.567** --- --- --- 0.101 
    (0.023)    (0.696) 
         
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  0.669 0.562 0.612 0.763 na na na na 
         
Log likelihood  -413.707 -417.884 -417.002 -416.071 -3047.656 -3077.010 -3067.517 -3054.444 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  48.98*** 40.63*** 42.40*** 4.26*** 105.48*** 46.77*** 65.75*** 91.90*** 
Alpha 0.407*** 0.527*** 0.499*** 0.472*** 1.044*** 1.334*** 0.210*** 1.106*** 
Observations  28 28 28 28 180 180 180 180 
         
         
 Panel B: “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Latin America  and the Caribbean” 
 East Asia and the Pacific  Latin America  and the Caribbean 
Constant  18.646*** 18.408*** 18.523*** 18.945*** 12.494*** 14.385*** 14.013*** 11.932*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure(ME) (-1) -0.242 0.111 0.018 -0.184 -0.666** -0.929***   -
0.856*** 
-0.629** 
 (0.492) (0.760) (0.959) (0.559) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) 
Terrorism incidents(-1) 0.485 --- --- --- 1.389*** --- --- --- 
 (0.173)    (0.000)    
Terrorism fatalities(-1) --- 0.439 --- --- --- 0.642** --- --- 
  (0.507)    (0.023)   
Terrorism injuries(-1) --- --- 0.486 --- --- --- 0.674** --- 
   (0.245)    (0.011)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages(-1) 
--- --- --- 0.565 --- --- --- 2.017*** 
    (0281)    (0.000) 
Terrorism incidents×ME(-1) 0.081 --- --- --- -0.443*** --- --- --- 
 (0.68)    (0.001)    
Terrorism fatalities×ME(-1) --- 0.046 --- --- --- -0.164 --- --- 
  (0.885)    (0.244)   
Terrorism injuries×ME(-1) --- --- 0.016 --- --- --- -0.196 --- 
   (0.936)    (0.115)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages×ME(-1) 
--- --- --- 0.101 --- --- --- -0.681*** 
 
   (0.696)    (0.000) 
         
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  na na na na 0.518 na na 0.678 
         
Log likelihood  -3047.656 -3077.010 -3067.517 -3054.444 -1438.722 -1450.904 -1449.843 -1442.511 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  105.48** 46.77*** 65.75*** 91.90*** 55.15*** 30.78*** 32.90*** 47.57*** 
Alpha 1.044*** 1.334*** 1.234*** 1.106*** 0.648*** 0.805*** 0.790*** 0.693*** 
Observations  180 180 180 180 92 92 92 92 
         
         
 Panel C: “Middle East and North Africa” and  Sub-Saharan Africa 
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 Middle East & North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
Constant  14.402*** 14.150*** 14.426*** 14.403*** 13.780*** 13.650*** 13.529*** 13.617*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure(ME) (-1) 0.593*** 0.481*** 0.512*** 0.535*** 0.162 0.268* 0.250* 0.237* 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.365) (0.082) (0.096) (0.081) 
Terrorism incidents(-1) 0.710*** --- --- --- 0.085 --- --- --- 
 (0.004)    (0.778)    
Terrorism fatalities(-1) --- 0.592** --- --- --- 0.271 --- --- 
  (0.013)    (0.278)   
Terrorism injuries(-1) --- --- 0.450** --- --- --- 0.234 --- 
   (0.024)    (0.287)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages(-1) 
--- --- --- 0.965*** --- --- --- 0.336 
    (0.001)    (0.440) 
Terrorism incidents×ME(-1) -0.233*** --- --- --- 0.067 --- --- --- 
 (0.003)    (0.709)    
Terrorism fatalities×ME(-1) --- -0.243*** --- --- --- -0.074 --- --- 
  (0.003)    (0.603)   
Terrorism injuries×ME(-1) --- --- -0.158** --- --- --- -0.064 --- 
   (0.024)    (0.607)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages×ME(-1) 
--- --- --- -0.327*** --- --- --- -0.039 
 
   (0.000)    (0.879) 
         
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  0.251 0.114 0.139 0.322 na na na na 
         
Log likelihood  -1114.089 -1114.090 -1115.633 -1112.656 -1941.442 -1942.334 -1942.319 -1941.148 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  26.73*** 26.73*** 23.64*** 29.60*** 92.45*** 90.66*** 90.69*** 93.04*** 
Alpha 0.797*** 0.797*** 0.827*** 0.771*** 0.667*** 0.674*** 0.674*** 0.664*** 
Observations  69 69 69 69 135 135 135 135 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Mean value of Military Expenditure: 1.966. Min and Maximum values of  
Military Expenditure are respectively 1.000 and 5.000. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of  unconditional effects of insecurity 
variables and/or conditional effect from the interaction between the security policy variable and insecurity variables.  
 
Appendices  
Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables 
  
Variables  Definition of variables and sources  
  
Tourism  The number of tourists arrivals  
  
Military expenditure  Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
Terrorism incidents  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of terrorist incidents in a given year. 
  
Terrorism fatalities  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given 
year 
  
Terrorism injuries  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given 
year 
  
Terrorism-related property 
damages  
Logarithm (1+ base) of the measure of the total number of properties damaged 
from terrorist incidents in a given year. 
  
Homicides  Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Violent demonstrations  Likelihood of violent demonstrations 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Armed Services Personnel Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics and presentation of countries  
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Tourist arrivals  6.7533e+6 1.2644e+7 8000.0 8.3767e+7 732 
      
Military expenditure  1.966 0.824 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Terrorism incidents(Ln) 1.328 1.850 0.000 8.122 977 
      
Terrorism fatalities(Ln) 1.153 2.016 0.000 9.203 977 
      
Terrorism injuries(Ln) 1.352 2.195 0.000 9.624 977 
      
Terrorism-related property 
damages(Ln) 
0.923 1.521 0.000 7.155 977 
      
Homicides  2.797 1.154 1.103 5.000 978   
      
Incarceration  2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
Violent demonstrations  2.912 0.969 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Armed Services Personnel 1.648 0.725 1.000 5.000 978 
      
      
Panel B: Sampled countries (163) 
 “Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe”. 
      
      
Standard dev: standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.   
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size = 732) 
           
T. Incid. T. Fat. T. Inju. T. Prop. Homicide Incarce Demon ASP Mili Exp. Tourists  
1.000 0.875 0.906 0.963 -0.009 -0.024 0.345 0.131 0.203 0.210 T. Incid. 
 1.000 0.927 0.844 0.113 -0.030 0.358 0.065 0.165 0.061 T. Fat. 
  1.000 0.878 0.042 0.001 0.352 0.119 0.199 0.119 T. Inju.  
   1.000 -0.001 -0.018 0.327 0.139 0.188 0.195 T. Prop. 
    1.000 0.182 0.274 -0.254 -0.149 -0.275 Homicide 
     1.000 -0.148 0.179 0.076 0.162 Incarce 
      1.000 -0.043 0.047 -0.189 Demon 
       1.000 0.579 0.034 ASP 
        1.000 0.030 Mili Exp. 
         1.000 Tourists 
           
Weapons: Access to weapons. Crime: Violent crime. Criminality: Perceptions of criminality. Pol. Inst: Political instability. ASP: Armed 
Service Personnel. Incarce: Incarcerations. Demon: Violent demonstrations. Mili Exp: Military Expenditure.   T. Incid: Total number of 
incidents in a given year. T. Fat: Total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year. T. Inju: Total number of injuries caused by 
terrorists in a given year. T. Prop: Total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year. 5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0725 for 
n = 732. 
 
